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the role that insurance can play in addressing losses from extreme events, both natural and man-made.
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Insurance against Extreme Events: 
Pairing Short-Term Incentives with 
Long-Term Strategies
Howard Kunreuther, PhD
Why do many homeowners purchase insurance only after experiencing a loss 
from a rare and extreme event, like an earthquake or a large hurricane?
Why do insurance companies classify certain types of 
risk as uninsurable? And why do insurance regulators 
prohibit insurers from setting premiums that reflect 
risk, particularly in locales that repeatedly suffer losses 
from natural disasters?1
The short answer is that insurance today is misun-
derstood and hence is not effectively meeting its most 
important objectives—to inform those at risk about 
the hazards they face, to reduce damage from future 
disasters and to provide claims payments to policy-
holders who suffer losses. More specifically, insurers 
and their regulators are not providing transparent 
information to people residing in hazard-prone areas 
as to the nature of the risks they face, and consum-
ers are not adequately incentivized to undertake loss 
reduction measures prior to a disaster. As a result, U.S. 
taxpayers have been on the hook for large losses from 
extreme events over the last few decades. The 2005 
and 2012 hurricane seasons alone cost taxpayers nearly 
$150 billion. 
The evidence on the increased losses from natural 
catastrophes and more extreme weather trends sug-
gests that the worst is yet to come. As of the end of 
2012, there was $35 trillion of insured exposure in 
the coastal states from Texas to Maine. If appropriate 
mitigation measures are not adopted, future hurri-
SUMMARY
• Consumers tend to purchase too little insurance or purchase it 
too late. Consequently, taxpayers wind up bearing substantial 
burdens for paying reconstruction costs from extreme events.  
The 2005 and 2012 hurricane seasons alone cost taxpayers 
nearly $150 billion. 
• There is much that can be done to better facilitate the role 
that insurance can play in addressing losses from extreme 
events, both natural and man-made.
• To better meet its objectives, insurance must implement two 
guiding principles. First, premiums should accurately reflect risk. 
But if this principle is put into effect, individuals in hazard-prone 
areas will face large, unexpected price increases, necessitating 
the second guiding principle: to ensure equity and affordability, 
special financial assistance should be made available to the 
homeowners who would no longer be able to afford their 
premiums.
• Other policy tools that can help reduce losses from extreme 
events include: choice architecture that will encourage individuals 
to purchase and maintain insurance; public-private partnerships 
to provide private insurers with federal reinsurance in the case 
of truly catastrophic disasters and to make low-interest loans 
and grants more available to property owners; and multi-year 
insurance policies tied to risk-prone properties.
• Collectively, these measures would lead to less property dam-
age, lower costs to homeowners, more secure mortgages, 
and lower costs to the government and taxpayers for disaster 
assistance.
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canes and floods are likely to replace 
Katrina and Sandy in the rankings of 
the most costly insured losses in the 
coming years.
In the United States, there is 
much that can be done to better facili-
tate the role that insurance can play in 
addressing these issues in the face of 
extreme events, both natural and man-
made. In particular, short-term incen-
tives and policy options are needed 
to improve the decision-making of 
consumers, insurance companies, and 
insurance regulators. 
To be effective, insurance requires 
accurate risk assessment for setting 
premiums that reflect the likelihood 
and consequences of damage. More-
over, insurers should conduct regular 
inspections to ensure that property 
meets existing building codes; they 
can then offer premium discounts for 
those who undertake loss reduction 
measures. This is the way that factory 
mutuals operated when they were 
founded in the mid-1800s. Firms were 
given an insurance policy only after 
they were inspected and shown to be 
safe. Insurance premiums reflected the 
best estimates of the risk; improve-
ments were rewarded with lower 
premiums reflecting the expected 
reduction in future claims. Firms that 
did not continue to keep their factories 
operating safely were warned that their 
insurance policy would be canceled 
unless they took corrective action.2 
Choice architecture, public-private 
partnerships, and multi-year insur-
ance policies all have a role to play 
here. At the same time, appropriate 
financial assistance programs must be 
developed for those whose risk-based 
premiums are so high that they cannot 
afford coverage.
INTUITIVE AND 
DELIBERATIVE THINKING
Decision-makers normally deal with 
risk by combining intuitive thinking 
with deliberative thinking. Intuitive 
thinking operates automatically and 
quickly, with little or no effort and no 
voluntary control. It is often guided 
by emotional reactions or simple rules 
of conduct that have been acquired by 
personal experience with events and 
their consequences. Deliberative think-
 1  This issue brief is based on Kunreuther, H. (2015). The Role 
of insurance in reducing losses from extreme events: The 
need for public-private partnerships, Geneva Papers on Risk 
and Insurance, 1018-5895/15, Vol. 40, pp. 741-762.
 2  Bainbridge, J. (1952). Biography of an Idea: The Story 
of Mutual Fire and Casualty Insurance, Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday; Kunreuther, H. and Roth, R., Sr, (eds.) (1998) 
Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance against 
Natural Disasters in the United States. Washington, D.C.: 
Joseph Henry Press. 
 3  Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
 4  Botzen et al. show that only 20% of those who suffered 
damage from Hurricane Sandy had purchased flood insur-
ance before the storm occurred.  Botzen, W., Kunreuther, H. 
and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015). Divergence between individual 
perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence 
from floodplain residents in New York City. Judgment and 
Decision Making 10(4): 365-385. 
 5  Michel-Kerjan, E., Lemoyne de Forges, S. and Kunreuther, 
H. (2012). Policy tenure under the U.S. National Flood Insur-
ance Program (NFIP). Risk Analysis 32(4): 644–658.
 6  Premiums are higher after a disaster because insurers seek 
to recoup losses by raising rates.
 7  Cummins, D.J. and Lewis, C.M. (2003). Catastrophic 
events, parameter uncertainty and the breakdown of implicit 
long-term contracting in the insurance market: The case of 
terrorism insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(2/3): 
153–178. 
 8  For more details on a proposed voucher program based on 
NOTES
TABLE 1: FIFTEEN MOST COSTLY INSURED CATASTROPHES (1970-2015) 
 
$ Billion Event Victims  Year Area of Primary Damage
78 Hurricane Katrina; floods 1,836 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
41 9/11 Attacks 3,025 2001 USA
37 Earthquake (M 9.0) and tsunami 19,135 2011 Japan
35 Hurricane Sandy; floods 237 2012 USA
26 Hurricane Andrew 43 1992 USA, Bahamas
22 Northridge Earthquake (M 6.6) 61 1994 USA
22 Hurricane Ike; floods 136 2008 USA, Caribbean
16 Hurricane Ivan 124 2004 USA, Caribbean
15 Floods; heavy monsoon rains 815 2011 Thailand
15 Earthquake (M 6.3); aftershocks 181 2011 New Zealand
15 Hurricane Wilma; floods 35 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
12 Hurricand Rita 34 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.
11 Drought in the Corn Belt 123 2012 USA
10 Hurricane Charley 24 2004 USA, Caribbean, et al.
10 Typhoon Mireille 51 1991 Japan
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ing allocates attention to effortful and 
intentional mental activities where 
individuals undertake trade-offs 
implicit in benefit-cost analysis, and 
recognize relevant interdependen-
cies and connectedness as well as the 
need for coordination in coping with 
extreme events. 
Behavioral decision research and 
cognitive psychology teach us that 
intuitive thinking, guided heavily by 
emotions and focused on short time 
horizons and goals, is a common 
human response for dealing with low-
probability, high-consequence events, 
oftentimes at the expense of adopting 
cost-effective deliberative strategies 
for mitigating future catastrophes.3 
Consumers who engage in intui-
tive thinking often fail to purchase 
insurance, or buy it only after suf-
fering losses from a disaster. Insur-
ers who engage in intuitive thinking 
sometimes proclaim that a risk is 
uninsurable even when the data exists 
to assess the risk (as in the case of 
earthquake insurance), or when the 
risk is insurable only with the help of 
a federal backstop against large losses 
(as in the case of terrorism insurance). 
Regulators sometimes prevent insurers 
from charging premiums that reflect 
risk, which may suggest to those resid-
ing in hazard-prone areas that they are 
safe from disasters when, in fact, they 
are not. 
These conditions often lead the 
federal government to allocate large 
sums of disaster relief that result in 
taxpayers bearing substantial burdens 
for paying reconstruction costs from 
extreme events. 
The history of flood insurance 
highlights the challenges we face 
today in encouraging property owners 
to invest in loss reduction measures. 
Following the Mississippi Flood of 
1927, private insurers ceased offer-
ing flood coverage because they felt 
the risk was uninsurable due to the 
possibility of highly-correlated large 
losses. In the wake of Hurricane 
Betsy in 1965, the federal government 
established the National Flood Insur-
ance Program (NFIP) in 1968. Since 
the inception of the NFIP, the federal 
government has been heavily subsi-
dizing flood insurance premiums for 
existing homes in flood-prone areas 
so that insurance would be affordable 
and to protect property values. How-
ever, when premiums are subsidized 
there is no incentive for homeowners 
to undertake loss reduction measures, 
or for the federal government to pro-
vide discounts for those who invest in 
loss reduction measures. 
Even though homeowners in 
hazard-prone areas are required to 
purchase flood insurance as a condi-
tion for a federally insured mortgage, 
many homeowners do not purchase 
this coverage until after they suffer 
a loss.4 A large percentage of these 
homeowners later drop their cover-
age if they do not make a claim over 
the next few years. An analysis of the 
NFIP portfolio found that just 73%  
of the 841,000 new flood insurance 
policies purchased in 2001 were 
still in force one year later. The rate 
dropped to 49% after two years and 
only 20% after eight years.5 This 
behavior of ignoring potential disas-
ters and overreacting to recent ones 
by purchasing policies when premi-
ums are at their highest seems con-
tradictory, but in fact it stems from 
the same source: a lack of information 
and incentives.6 
The problem, in large part, lies in 
the widely held view that insurance  
is an investment from which indi-
viduals expect a return in the form of 
claims payments following a disaster. 
In reality, insurance is a protective 
measure should one suffer a loss. 
Homeowners should celebrate not 
having a loss because the financial 
consequences for an uninsured indi-
vidual could be staggering. One open 
question is how to communicate to 
empirical data, see: Kousky, C. and Kunreuther, H. (2014). 
Addressing affordability in the national flood insurance 
program. Journal of Extreme Events 1(1): 1–28.
 9  Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: The Gentle Power 
of Choice Architecture, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
 10  Weinstein, N.D., Kolb, K. and Goldstein, B.D. (1996). Using 
time intervals between expected events to communicate risk 
magnitudes. Risk Analysis 16(3): 305–308. 
 11  Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
 12  For more information, see http://shoreupct.org/
 13  For more details on the renewal of TRIA, see: Kunreuther, 
H., Michel-Kerjan, E., Lewis, C., Muir-Wood, R. and Woo, G. 
(2014). TRIA after 2014. Wharton Risk Management Center, 
University of Pennsylvania.
 14  Kunreuther, H. and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015). Demand for 
fixed-price multi-year contracts: Experimental evidence from 
insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 51(2): 
171-194.
 15  Well-enforced building codes in Chile led to the relatively low 
death toll from the 8.8 magnitude earthquake that shook 
the country in 2010. See: Useem, M., Kunreuther, H. and 
Michel-Kerjan, E. (2015) Leadership Dispatches: Chile’s Ex-
traordinary Comeback from Disaster. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 16  Lewis, C. and Murdock, L. (1996). The role of government 
contracts in discretionary reinsurance markets for natural 
disasters. Journal of Risk and Insurance 63(4): 567–597. 
 17  Repetto, R. and Easton, R. (2012). Climate change and dam-
age from extreme weather events. Environment 52(2): 22–33.
NOTES 
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people that the best return on an insur-
ance policy is no return at all.
Homeowners are not the only 
stakeholders to exhibit systematic 
biases and utilize simplified decision 
rules. Consider insurance and reinsur-
ance companies in the presence of 
ambiguous risk. Most insurers instinc-
tively stopped underwriting policies 
to cover losses from terrorist attacks 
after 9/11 because reinsurers refused 
to protect them against losses from 
another attack.7 Protection against 
terrorism was never explicitly priced in 
or excluded from commercial policies 
prior to that event, despite numerous 
attacks in the preceding decade. How-
ever, terrorism was deemed an unin-
surable risk almost overnight, largely 
because there was no rule of thumb to 
instruct actuaries and underwriters on 
how to assess the likelihood or magni-
tude of the risk. 
Regulators are also susceptible to 
intuitive thinking errors that can lead 
to inefficient outcomes. For example, 
state insurance regulators occasionally 
restrict insurers from setting premi-
ums that reflect risk in an attempt 
to guarantee equity and fairness for 
homeowners, regardless of their vary-
ing levels of risk. 
TWO GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
OF INSURANCE
Insurance fails to meet its objectives 
when it does not heed what should 
be its two guiding principles. As 
discussed in a previous Penn Whar-
ton Public Policy Issue Brief (Vol.1 
No. 9), the first principle states that 
premiums should reflect risk as a means 
of signaling to individuals how safe or 
exposed they are, as well as the extent 
to which preventive or protective 
measures will reduce their vulnerabil-
ity to losses and hence their premi-
ums. If this principle is applied in 
hazard-prone areas where premiums 
are currently subsidized, some resi-
dents will face large, unexpected price 
increases, which leads to the second 
guiding principle.
If premiums should reflect risk, 
then equity and affordability need to 
be considered. Special financial assis-
tance should be made available to 
the homeowners currently residing 
in hazard-prone areas who would no 
longer be able to afford their premi-
ums. The assistance could come from 
means-tested vouchers8 or through 
other means such as tax credits or tax 
rebates. It should not be in the form 
of a subsidized insurance premium. 
This principle applies only to indi-
viduals with limited means who 
currently reside in hazard-prone areas. 
Those who choose to move to these 
areas would be charged premiums that 
reflect their true risk. 
Risk-based insurance pricing 
opens the door for significant pre-
mium reduction potential if home-
owners take steps to mitigate their 
property risks. Elevating a home 
within a floodplain, for example,  
could lead to greatly reduced insur-
ance premiums, but such an invest-
ment is costly. To facilitate the process 
of mitigating one’s home, vouchers or  
tax credits could be coupled with low-
cost, long-term loans to spread the 
cost of mitigation over the life of  
the mortgage.
POLICY TOOLS TO IMPROVE 
DELIBERATIVE RISK 
MANAGEMENT POLICY
Beyond the two guiding principles of 
insurance, understanding decision-
making under risk and uncertainty 
also is essential for insurers, regula-
tors, and policymakers. The following 
list of policy tools provides structure 
for applying the guiding principles to 
reduce losses from extreme events in 
the long run.
1. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE
Decisions often depend on how 
options are presented and how prob-
abilities are framed.9 For example, 
consumers better grasp the likelihood 
of suffering losses from an extreme 
event if the odds are given over a  
longer timeline. Homeowners are 
more likely to pay attention to their 
flood risk if they are told that they 
have a greater than 1-in-5 chance 
of experiencing at least one severe 
flood in the next 25 years rather than 
indicating to them that there is a 
1-in-100 probability of a severe flood 
next year.10 
Making insurance purchase the 
default option may also lead to better 
coverage for homeowners, as many 
experiments show that individuals 
tend to stick with pre-selected choices 
instead of opting out and seeking 
alternative options in situations with 
outcomes that are certain or where 
the default option carries the highest 
expected benefit.11 This tool has not 
yet been tested on purchasing and 
maintaining catastrophe insurance. 
2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
There is a role for government to play 
in helping incentivize stakeholders. 
5publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
For example, Public-Private Partner-
ships (PPPs) can assist individu-
als who cannot otherwise afford to 
invest in protective measures because 
of high upfront costs. Homeowners’ 
resistance to undertaking mitigating 
action increases if they plan to move 
in the next few years because of their 
fear that the property value of their 
house will not reflect the expected 
benefits of their flood- or wind-proof-
ing investments.
PPPs make mitigation measures 
accessible and affordable through low 
interest loans and grants that are cur-
rently offered by the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA) 
to property owners in hazard-prone 
areas. In July 2014, Connecticut 
initiated its Shore Up CT program 
designed to help residential and busi-
ness property-owners elevate build-
ings, retrofit properties with addi-
tional flood protection, or assist with 
wind-proofing structures on property 
that is prone to coastal flooding. This 
state program, the first in the United 
States, enables homeowners to obtain 
a 15-year loan ranging from $10,000 
to $300,000 at an annual interest rate 
of 2-3/4 (two and three-quarters) 
percent.12
An innovation would be to market 
disaster insurance and the mitigation 
loan as a package tied to the property. 
This program would address both the 
mitigation and affordability issues 
simultaneously. Homeowners who 
invest in cost-effective loss-reduction 
measures would be given a premium 
discount to reflect the reduction in 
expected losses from disasters, which 
would more than pay for the cost of 
their home improvement loans. Net 
financial benefits from undertaking 
the mitigation measure would then be 
obvious to the homeowner.
On the supply side, private insur-
ers would be more willing to provide 
coverage against extreme events if the 
public sector covered part of the losses 
should the disaster be catastrophic. 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA), passed after the 9/11 attacks, 
is a federal backstop for private insur-
ers that limits catastrophic losses for 
insurance companies. American tax-
payers will not be responsible for any 
payments until the total commercial 
losses from a terrorist attack exceed 
$60 billion. In return for the federal 
reinsurance, insurers are required to 
make terrorism insurance available 
to all their commercial clients, even 
though firms are under no obligation 
to buy this insurance.13 
Insurers’ withdrawal from certain 
markets led to the establishment of 
government-backed programs such as 
the California Earthquake Author-
ity and the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP).
3. MULTI-YEAR INSURANCE POLICIES
A useful complement to incentivizing 
property improvement is a multi-
year insurance (MYI) policy tied to 
the property. Insurers could consider 
designing three-to-five-year poli-
cies, to dissuade policyholders from 
canceling their policies if they did not 
suffer losses for several years. Prop-
erty owners would benefit from stable 
annual premiums and would incur a 
penalty should they cancel their policy 
unless they sold their house during 
this period. MYI policies would also 
motivate insurers to inspect proper-
ties over time to ensure building code 
compliance—something they would 
not do with annual contracts—and 
would decrease their marketing costs. 
Empirical evidence from a controlled 
experiment indicates that buyers 
prefer a two-year insurance contract 
to one-year contracts even with higher 
annual premiums. And just intro-
ducing the two-year option into the 
menu of choices increases aggregate 
consumer demand for disaster insur-
ance.14 However, MYI policies are 
non-starters for insurers without their 
ability to charge risk-based premiums.
4. ADDITIONAL POLICY TOOLS
Other policy options for overcoming 
the challenges inherent in the intui-
tive thinking of consumers, insurers, 
and regulators include: 
• Requiring homeowners in hazard-
prone areas to carry coverage for 
catastrophic risk.
• Holding builders and original 
owners accountable for all disaster-
related damage in the event of 
building violations. Chile does this, 
and the accountability period lasts 
up to a decade.15
• Providing seals of approval certify-
ing that a property owner has taken 
steps toward mitigating disaster risk. 
These would be signals to potential 
buyers and would help to ensure 
that property values adequately 
reflect risk reduction investments.
• Auctioning (at the federal level) a 
limited number of annual catastro-
phe reinsurance contracts to private 
insurers, extending backstop protec-
tion for risks other than terrorism.16
The social welfare benefits of these 
strategies and policy tools are  
numerous. Collectively, they would lead 
to less damage to property, lower costs 
to insurers for protecting against cata-
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strophic losses, more secure mortgages, 
and lower costs to the government and 
taxpayers for disaster assistance. 
DATA NEEDED
In order to determine the price of 
risk-based premiums and affordabil-
ity, there is need for more accurate 
data, a principal reason that FEMA 
is now updating their flood risk maps. 
Anonymized census data on house-
hold income and other factors such 
as percentage of income spent on 
mortgage would help to inform crite-
ria for determining circumstances and 
methods on how financial assistance 
could be provided to address afford-
ability issues. 
One risk in particular that federal 
agencies and other organizations have 
greatly underestimated is climate 
change and sea level rise. Forecasting 
the potential damage from climate 
change and sea level rise and pre-
paring policy responses to extreme 
weather events require that risk 
management stakeholders more fully 
address assessment, mitigation, and 
affordability concerns sooner rather 
than later.17
CONCLUSION
The United States must capitalize 
on the concerns raised by Hurricane 
Sandy and the discussions for the 
renewal of the NFIP in 2017. The 
NFIP is $27 billion in debt to the 
U.S. Treasury in the aftermath of 
hurricanes over the last decade, and 
the most accurate scientific models 
suggest that we are going to face even 
more extreme weather in the  
coming years. If premiums reflecting 
risk based on accurate, data-driven 
risk assessment can be augmented 
by public-private partnerships that 
support mitigation loans, grants, and 
means-tested vouchers to ensure 
affordability, insurance in the United 
States could begin to reach its poten-
tial. Reducing the need for taxpayer 
money for future disaster relief should 
be a top priority for policymakers.
For risk-based insurance to be part 
of such a strategy, there is a need for 
support from key interested parties. 
These include real estate agents, devel-
opers, banks and financial institutions, 
and residents in hazard-prone areas, 
as well as public sector organizations 
at the local, state and federal levels. 
Insights from behavioral science, 
innovations from the insurance indus-
try, and other policy tools can then aid 
in directing consumers, insurers, and 
regulators towards this vision of stra-
tegic disaster-risk management policy.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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